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The growing presence and transient nature of for-profit higher education institutions in 
the United States (US) pose governance and regulatory challenges for bureaucratic 
structures, legislatures and non-profit postsecondary institutions. One such challenge is 
the perceived lack of governance and regulation of for-profit higher education 
institutions. The inability of data to meet the assumptions of both multiple linear 
regression and Poisson regression required utilization of ordinal logistic regression to 
investigate the impact of the higher education regulatory environment (independent 
variables) in the US on the presence of for-profit higher education institutions (dependent 
variable). The study found that state higher education governance structure and two 
regional accrediting agencies influence the prevalence of for-profit colleges and 
universities. These findings suggest that policies that support the growth of for-profit 
higher education institutions as part of state economic development goals undermine 
policies that attempt to regulate higher education in that state, resulting in the need for 
strengthened state governance as well as laws and policies that are congruent with state 
and federal economic development goals. 
 
 
 
   n 2010, there were approximately 4,589 colleges and universities operating with a 
physical presence across the United States (NCES 2012) enrolling approximately 20.1 
million students.  These institutions include private and public, for-profit and non-profit 
technical and career, 2- and 4-year, and graduate level.  The total number of private for-
profit degree-granting institutions in the US is 1,310, which accounts for 28.5% of all 
higher education institutions (NCES 2012).  For-profit higher education institutions are 
colleges and universities registered as businesses and/or firms owned by either a family (or 
individual) or private and/or public corporations that seek to earn profits as a result of their 
operations.  Also referred to as proprietary colleges and/or universities, they have increased 
in the number of institutions from 724 in 2000 to 1,310 in 2010 (80.9%).  This accounts for 
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the fastest growth among all sectors of higher education. 
The growing presence and transient nature of for-profit higher education 
institutions (FPHIED) pose governance and regulatory challenges. A major challenge is 
related to the complexity associated with private higher education governance.  Differences 
in state governance of FPHIEDs allow institutions to incorporate in one state and open 
branches or additional campuses in other states. Getting established in a state or locale with 
the fewest barriers is common among other types of businesses, and is a strategy utilized to 
minimize regulatory obstacles to incorporation.  It is unclear, however, how influential the 
regulatory environment is on location decisions.  Recent studies have found limited to no 
impact of the regulatory environment on location decision-making (Holt, Purcell, Gray and 
Pedersen 2006; Tole and Koop 2011). , Some argue, however, that FPHIEDs participate in 
“accreditation shopping that occurs when colleges and universities establish institutions in 
states under the jurisdiction of more accommodating accrediting agencies (Kinser 2005).  
Accreditation shopping is an example of what classical location theorist Predöhl (1928) 
referred to as substitution.  Substitution happens when a firm chooses the most efficient 
means of obtaining a desired result, which in this case is regional accreditation. What results 
is the limited ability of some states to hold accountable FPHIEDs that operate within their 
respective borders. 
Another challenge is the lack of direct regulation by the US Department of 
Education (DOE).  Regional accrediting agencies recognized by the US DOE serve as by-
proxy regulators of higher education in the US.  At least on its face by-proxy regulation 
suggests there is limited direct federal regulation of higher education. While this type of 
higher education regulation is consistent across all institutions in the US, the problem is 
public institutions are also accountable at the state level but FPHIEDs are not.  This means 
that FPHIEDs have fewer regulatory checks than their public and non-profit counterparts. 
This paper is examines the governance of higher education and is focused on 
determining the higher education regulatory factors that may influence the prevalence of 
for-profit higher education institutions in the US.  The goal is to determine if states should 
regulate FPHIEDs more or less.  The key research question is what higher education 
governance factors influence the presence of 4-year degree granting FPHIEDs in the US. 
To this end, the paper is organized as follows: the first section outlines the 
theoretical framework; the second section describes the data and methodology for the study; 
the third section presents and analyzes the results, and concludes with a discussion of policy 
implications. 
 
Business Regulation  
This study tests the theory that stronger regulations (higher education regulations) result in 
fewer businesses (FPHIEDs), and likewise, weaker regulations result in more.  This 
principle was noted with the mercantile system in the early years of America.  According to 
Edwards (1998), independent competitors conducted business in the suburbs and rural areas 
in order to flee regulatory influence because regulatory enforcement was strongest in the 
cities.  Other examples are seen with US companies moving operations from the US to 
Mexico to decrease costs associated with compliance with regulatory mandates including, 
but not limited to, wages and labor laws. 
One of the most politically vocalized reasons for government regulations is citizen 
and consumer protection.  Regulation can be thrust upon industry as a result of pressures 
placed on policy-makers (Peltzman 1976).  In this instance, governmental regulation is 
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established to protect the interests of the public, balance the playing fields within industry, 
and to restrict or minimize corruption (Stigler 1971).  Protecting the public interest from 
industry appeals to politicians because it provides a platform on which to base industry 
regulation and help garner support to for re-election to office.  Weighty attention to industry 
interests result in corruption, moral hazard, and ultimately market failures.  This constitutes 
the normative theory of market-failure, or public interest theory of regulation, which 
legitimates regulations in the face of deficiency in the market (Edwards and Edwards 1974; 
Jakee and Allen 1998). 
 
Higher Education Regulation 
Higher education has been historically scrutinized for a lack of formal regulation.  While 
policy-making in the US tends to emanate from the federal level and extend to the state 
level, this has not been the case for higher education.  To the contrary, on the surface it 
appears that few, if any, federal regulations of higher education actually inform state higher 
education policies. 
More recently the former Deputy Undersecretary of the US Department of 
Education, Robert Shireman, criticized the regulation of higher education.  At the federal 
level, higher education regulation has primarily consisted of proxy measures of federal 
regulation that rely heavily on regional accreditation agencies establishing and enforcing 
standards for US higher education.  Accrediting agencies receive funding to administer 
standards, but have no formal regulatory power.  In fact, the incentive to adhere to regional 
accreditation standards lies in an institutions eligibility to receive Title IV federal student 
aid funds.  Essentially, a college/university must oblige regional accrediting agencies in 
order for its students to be able to receive over $150 billion in federal student aid funds. 
In the April 29, 2010 edition of insidehighered.com, Deputy Undersecretary 
Shireman likened the accreditation agencies to Wall Street ratings agencies that are charged 
with regulating an industry they rely on for funding support.  His claim is based on a 
“conflict of interest” assumption.  Institutions pay accreditation agencies for membership, 
while agencies, in turn, regulate institutional quality.  The absence of a coordinated system 
of regulation by state and federal agencies has resulted in a “lack of firepower” to regulate 
higher education in the US, according to former Deputy Undersecretary Shireman.  Also 
resulting are overarching higher education policies developed at the state level that tend to 
be fragmented. This section will outline the current state of higher education governance 
and regulation at the state, federal and accreditation agency levels. 
 
HIED Governance Pre-1990 
State-Level Governance Pre-1990 
A number of states in the US redesigned their existing higher education governance systems 
more than 60 years ago.  In fact, McLendon et al (2007, 647) claim “The modern era of 
[US] public higher education governance dates to the late 1950s…”  During that time higher 
education was primarily unregulated.  Postwar explosion of enrollments and public funding 
on higher education prompted investigations into new governance models that would 
enhance efficiency and coordination.   
 
Federal-Level Governance Pre-1990 
In addition to state-level governance of US higher education institutions, there is a proxy for 
federal-level oversight of higher education: regional and national accrediting agencies.  
Accreditation arose as a means to differentiate college from high school education and to 
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protect academic freedom.  Present day “…[a]ccreditation aims to preserve and enhance 
quality in higher education.  It is a voluntary exercise in which an institution or program 
agrees to engage in self-study operating within the guidelines of a recognized accrediting 
agency” (Bloland 1999, 362).  Accreditation is a peer-reviewed process that examines the 
success of the institution in meeting agency selected characteristics of a good quality 
educational program and fulfilling its own mission.  Regional accreditation jurisdiction is 
made up of states within the region.  For example, the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools has jurisdiction over eleven states including, but not limited to Alabama, Florida, 
Texas and Virginia. 
The enforcement power of accreditation in the US is based on an institutions 
eligibility to receive Title IV funds.  In the 1940s accreditation in the US was linked to the 
ability of an institution to receive federal funds and loans through the passage of the 
Servicemens’ Readjustment Act of 1944, namely the GI Bill (Martin 1994).  The use of 
accreditation served as a means for the federal government to ensure accountability without 
exerting direct federal control over higher education.   
 
HIED Governance Post-1990  
State-Level Governance Post-1990 
Since 2000, interest in the broader scope of governance of higher education systems has 
increased.  Only a relatively few studies examine governance in state higher education 
agencies (Kezar 2006; Shakespeare 2008).  One major study of state-level higher education 
governance was published by Kezar in 2006, in which members of state higher education 
agencies, legislators and college presidents were interviewed in an effort to assess the 
effectiveness of state higher education agencies.  Kezar employed a business model 
approach that emphasizes boards of directors in her examination of higher education 
governance due to the lack of research on higher education governance board models.  The 
limited attention to state-level governance prompted some academics in higher education 
policy to call for an extended research agenda that addresses the political implications and 
impacts of and on higher education (McLendon 2003).   
 
Federal-Level Governance Post-1990 
The US Department of Education used the accreditation process as a means to regulate 
postsecondary institutions (Bloland 1999) since the early 1990s.  The 1992 reauthorization 
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 required accreditation by the recognized regional 
agencies as a condition of eligibility to receive Title IV federal student aid funds.  As a 
result, accreditation became a highly contested issue that ignited significant debate within 
the higher education accreditation community.  Practitioners and scholars were concerned 
with the amount of control and influence the federal government, through the US DOE, was 
exerting on schools and accrediting agencies.  Accreditation and the accrediting agencies 
were increasingly viewed as being heavily influenced by federal and state governments, and 
therefore, not an independent entity (Bloland 1999; Brittingham 2008).  Some within the 
higher education industry argued that “education is not one of the powers delegated to the 
federal government” and, therefore, the federal government should mind its own business 
(Neal 2008, 25).  Others argued the need for federal regulation of higher education because 
of past practices of discrimination, skyrocketing costs of attendance and the large amounts 
of federal dollars that support higher education.     
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The use of accreditation as a means to become and remain eligible for Title IV 
funds led to speculation that some for-profit higher education institutions participate in 
“accreditation shopping” (Kinser 2005, 76).  Kinser presented a qualitative study of 65 for-
profit institutions in the US, all of which were accredited by regional accreditation agencies.  
His work revealed inconsistencies in the operation of the six regional accrediting bodies.  
The lack of consistency could bolster concern that one agency’s distinctive policies could 
cause “…regional accreditation as a national policy of quality control…” to suffer (Kinser 
2005, 76).   In short, the literature would suggest these things but they are outside the scope 
of this study.  In sum, citizen and consumer protection have served to driving factor in the 
push for regulation.  Even in the midst of public outcry, the federal government and the 
states have yet to fully address regulating higher education in the US in a way that is 
aggregated across to two levels of government.  State level governance of HIED has 
appeared to strengthen overtime but its impact has not been fully determined in the 
literature.  The hands-off regulatory approach of the federal government has become 
increasingly criticized.  This regulatory quandary has resulted in limited research on HIED 
governance and its effectiveness, as well as greater and more complex enforcement issues.  
 
Hypotheses  
This study set forth three hypotheses.  First, it was hypothesized that stronger state higher 
education governance structure are more likely to result in lower numbers of FPHIEDs.  
The second hypothesis suggests that stronger state higher education regulatory 
characteristics are more likely to result in lower numbers of FPHIEDs.  Finally, the third 
hypothesis surmises that the NCACS jurisdiction is more likely to result in high numbers of 
FPHIEDs that states in other regional accrediting agency jurisdictions (i.e., MSACS, 
NEACS, NWCCU, SACS, and WASC).  NCACS was responsible for approving half of all 
for-profit higher education with distance education programs, suggesting that NCACS is 
accommodating towards FPHIEDs (Kinser 2005).  
 
Methodology 
Research Design 
Ordinal logistic regression (OLR) is employed in this study to investigate the impact of the 
higher education regulatory environment in the US on the presence of for-profit higher 
education institutions.  For the purposes of this study, the presence of FPHIEDs is 
operationalized as the number of FPHIEDs in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and 
characterized into three categories: none, low and high.  OLR has its foundation in logistic 
regression which allows the prediction of a dichotomous outcome variable from continuous, 
discrete and/or dichotomous independent variables (Mertler and Vannatta 2005; Tabachnik 
and Fidell 2007).   ORL is the most appropriate technique because of the categorical and 
ordered nature of the dependent variable.  It is used here to identify the combination of 
independent variables that best predict membership into one of two or more categories of 
the number of FPHIEDs in an MSA.   
 
Data Collection and Analysis  
Secondary data were collected from the US Census, National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES), Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009), Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the Council of Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) from 
2000, 2007, and 2009, respectively.  The rationale for the use of secondary data includes the 
limited availability of FPHIED location decision-makers.  In most cases, the individuals 
5
Myers and Mengistu: The Impact of the Higher Education Regulatory Environment on For-
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2014
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy                 Spring 2014 
 
- 89 - 
who made the location decisions of FPHIEDs are no longer with those respective 
institutions.  Additionally, there is limited data on FPHIEDs in both the higher education 
and business literatures. 
 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The number of FPHIEDs, observed at the MSA level in the US, served as the dependent 
variable (DV).  The DV was originally observed as count data, but recoded into the 
following categories: none, low and high numbers of FPHIEDs in an MSA. While the 
“none” category indicates the absence of FPHIEDs in an MSA, the “low” category includes 
between 1 and 4 FPHIEDs, and the “high” category includes 5 or more FPHIEDs in an 
MSA.  Categorical cut-points were selected because they approximated a more even 
distribution in the number of MSAs represented in each category of the DV. 
The independent variables used in this study are state higher education governance 
structure (governance), state higher education regulation of FPHIEDs (regulation), regional 
accreditation agency and population.  Their use is grounded in the public administration, 
economic development, and higher education literatures.  Theories of economic regulation 
assert that high levels of regulation restrict economic development by constraining new 
competitors and allowing for unequal distributions of control in favor of politically 
powerful firms.  Their influence on non-traditional for-profit entities, like higher education 
institutions, is less clear however.  Governance is theorized to have similar effects on 
economic growth and development is regulation. 
Higher education governance structure predictors are categorized as either 
governing boards or coordinating bodies.  Governing boards are characterized as statutory 
bodies “…established by legislation in the form of statutes or legal instruments” to conduct 
state higher education business (Thynne 2006, 172). These types of agencies are set up by 
legislative action that is not easily changed by the government or the agency.  Coordinating 
bodies are state higher education agencies with legislatively delegated authority, which 
serve as a link between the legislature and the higher education institutions within that state.  
Coordinating bodies are described primarily by the principle-agent nature of their 
relationship with the legislature (McLendon 2003).  Governing boards have more power to 
constrain and control higher education within the state and are, therefore, considered to 
exhibit higher levels of higher education governance. Coordinating bodies, on the other 
hand, have the ability to recommend and advise institutions to act.  Conversely, states with 
coordinating bodies have lower levels of higher education governance. 
State higher education regulatory characteristics are based on state requirements 
imposed on FPHIEDs as a condition of operating within their respective state.  For example, 
some states have no requirements for FPHIEDs to operate within their boundaries (lowest 
level of regulation).  Other states require state agency approval before FPHIEDs are 
permitted to operate (medium level of regulation). Yet other states require Department of 
Education approval through regional accreditation prior to granting permission to FPHIEDs 
to function within their borders (highest level of regulation).  Therefore, states with more 
stringent requirements of FPHIEDs prior to operating within their borders are considered to 
have higher levels of regulatory characteristics. 
There are six regional accrediting agencies approved by the US Department of 
Education: Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools (MSACS), New England 
Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), North Central Association of Colleges and 
Schools (NCACS), Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities (NWCCU), 
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Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), Western Association of Schools and 
Colleges (WASC).  Table 1 lists the regional accrediting agencies and their respective state 
and territory jurisdictions. 
 
Table 1. Regional Accrediting Agencies and Jurisdiction (as of January 2014) 
Agency Name   States/Territories within Jurisdiction 
MSACS 
 
DC, DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands 
NEASC 
 
CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT 
NCACS 
 
AZ, AR, CO, IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, NM,ND, OH, 
OK, SD, WV, WI, WY 
NWCCU 
 
AK, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA 
SACS 
 
AL, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA 
WASC  
CA, HI, Guam, Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, 
Micronesia, Marshall Islands 
Source: Adapted from Texas Education Agency Ask Ted, Data retrieved July, 2010 
 
Limitations 
The scope of this study is limited in its exclusion of some factors that influence the 
establishment of for-profit organizations such as the availability of and/or location of 
rentable/leasable space.  It may be that the location selections are better explained in terms 
of proximity to major interstates and local roads or the availability of quality office space.  
These factors have been found to be significant in traditional business decision-making 
literature, but have not been generalized to this sub-category of for-profit enterprises: higher 
education institutions.  Additionally, these variables are specific to final site selections, 
which often occur after a boarder location decision has been made (Bailey, Badway and 
Gumport 2001).  Therefore, these variables were excluded from this study.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Selected Descriptive Statistics 
Data for 366 MSA were used to compile demographic and demand variables, population, 
median family income, unemployment rates, educational attainment and racial composition.  
The total number of MSAs represented in this study constitutes 97.8% of all MSAs in the 
US, or 366 of 374.   Four-year, degree-granting for-profits colleges/universities in the US 
(N=530) are located in approximately 127 of 366 MSAs (34.7%).  Using MSA level data 
account for regional market forces, which have long been argued to influence business 
decisions (Brown 1979; Predöhl 1928). 
All the variables used in the study were continuous but were transformed into 
interval variables for use in the regression model.  Average MSA population was 703,156; 
however, the average was skewed by outlier MSAs including Los Angeles and New York 
City MSAs with more than 12 million people each.  The average MSA median family 
income in 2007 (as reported in 2010) was $57,894.  MSAs had an average unemployment 
rate of 9.15%.  Average MSA educational attainment was 85.22% for HS/GED.  The 
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average percent of Blacks in the MSA population was 10.43%.  Table 2 lists descriptive 
statistics for selected variables. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   N Mean         S.D.  Range  
Population 
 
366 703,156  1,589,493        19,014,620.00  
Median Family Income 
 
363 57,893.96  9845.68        67,095.00  
MSA Unemployment Rate 
 
363 9.15 3.07                      29.10  
Educational Attainment: 
HS/GED Completion 
 
366 85.22 5.61                      35.80  
State Corporate Tax Rate 
 
321 6.55 2.5              12.00  
 
Regression Analysis 
It was hypothesized that elevated levels of state higher education governance structure 
would decrease the odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs.  For a one unit increase in state 
higher education governance structure, there is a .22 decrease in the ordered log odds of 
higher levels of FPHIEDs, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant.  
As a result, a one unit decrease in the state HIED governance structure (i.e., from governing 
board to coordinating body), increases the odds of more FPHIEDs locating within that state 
by 1.25 times. 
Higher levels of state higher education regulatory characteristics were projected to 
result in decreased odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs.  Holding all other variables 
constant, there is a .06 decrease in the ordered log odds of a high level of FPHIEDs with a 
one unit increase in state higher education regulatory characteristics.  Consequently, a one 
unit decrease in the state higher education regulatory characteristics increases the odds of 
more FPHIEDs locating within that state by 1.06 times. 
Membership in Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools (MSACS) 
results in a 3.72 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, 
holding all other variables in the model constant.  Therefore, membership in MSACS 
jurisdiction increases the odds of being in a lower category of FPHIEDs by 41.42 times.  
Membership in the New England Association of Colleges and Schools (NEACS) results in a 
1.16 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, holding all 
other variables constant.  Thus NEACS membership increases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs 
locating within that state by 3.17 times.  Northwest Commission on Colleges and 
Universities (NWCCU) membership results in a .68 decrease in the ordered log odds of 
being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, given all other variables in the model are held constant.  
Consequently, membership in NWCCU increases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs locating 
within that state by 1.97 times.  Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) 
membership results in a .30 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of 
FPHIEDs, holding all other variables equal.  Therefore, SACS membership increases the 
odds of fewer FPHIEDs by 1.36 times.  Membership in the Western Association of Colleges 
and Schools (WASC) results in a .35 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher 
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level of FPHIEDs, given that all other variables are held constant.  WASC membership 
decreases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs locating within that state by 1.42 times. 
MSACS, MSA population, and HS/GED are statistically significant at p<.05.  
Higher education governance structure is significant at p=.031.  The OLR model explained 
a highly satisfactory portion of the variance in the dependent variable based on the widely 
used estimate of Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2=.545 (Meyers, Gamst and Guarino 2006; 
Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).   Nagelkerke’s Psuedo R-squared is a goodness-of-fit test that 
attempts to identify the proportion of variance explained by the predictor variables, and was 
selected because it corrects the Cox and Snell R-squared for its inability to report a perfect 
fit (R2=1.0).  Nagelkerke Pseudo R-squared is one of the most reported R-squared estimates 
in logistic regression (Burns and Burns 2008; Meyers, Gamst and Guarino 2006).  See 
Table 3 below for the OLR model. 
 
Discussion 
Higher education governance has been relatively unchanged over the last 20 years, while 
many other aspects of the higher education environment experienced tremendous 
expansion.  In other words, governance of higher education has lagged behind the major 
shifts in the higher education environment.  The changes in the higher education setting 
have primarily occurred in the area of private, for-profit colleges and universities.  This 
sector has proven to be a challenge to regulate at the state and federal levels.  While 
increased criticism has triggered a call for improved governance and regulation of for-profit 
higher education, there has been little attention given to what governance and regulatory 
factors actually influence the behavior of FPHIEDs.  This study identified the higher 
education governance factors that influence the number of FPHIEDs present in a given 
state. 
This study shows that some higher education governance factors influence the 
prevalence of FPHIEDs, while others have no impact.  Specifically, three higher education 
governance factors influenced the number of FPHIEDs present: state higher education 
governance, MSACS and NEACS regional accrediting agencies.  Other higher education 
governance factors did not influence the presence of FPHIEDs.  The non-influential higher 
education governance factors were state higher education regulatory characteristics, four of 
six regional accrediting agencies (North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, 
Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, Southern Association of Colleges and 
Universities, and Western Association of Schools and Colleges). 
Previous studies have shown the influence of a wide range of governance, 
demographic and demand factors on the location decisions of for-profit businesses overall, 
but not for-profit higher education institutions specifically.  This research included 
governance, demographic and demand factors found to be significant in previous location 
decision and education studies.  Only a small number of factors emerged as significant 
predictors.  While few hypotheses were supported at the bivariate or multivariate levels, the 
ordinal logistic regression models explained a large amount of the variance (Nagelkerke’s 
Pseudo R2=.545). 
 
Predictor Variables   
This study supports the theory that higher levels of governance restrain FPHIEDs based on 
ordinal logistic regression modeling, and identifies the two governance factors that 
influence the number of FPHIEDs: state higher education governance structure and 
MSACS, a regional accrediting jurisdiction.  Also supported is the finding that high levels 
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of for-profit higher education institutions locate in places with higher levels of population, 
which is consistent with most business and economic theory that population is a driver of 
business decision-making (Khalil, Ellaboudy and Denzau 2007).  Areas with high rates of 
population spur economic investment and development.  Therefore, as MSA populations 
increase, so does the likelihood of increasing the prevalence of FPHIEDs. 
 
Governance Implications  
State higher education governance structures were redesigned in the late 1950s into what 
currently exists in the US.  The modern structures have lagged behind the advancement of 
the for-profit sector of higher education.  Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001) claim that 
governance is important to achieving policy or organizational objectives.   As a result, 
politicians might change governance structures in an effort to generate more satisfactory 
outcomes.  This study found evidence that state higher education governance structures 
have statistically significant impact on the number of FPHIEDs present within an MSA.  In 
essence, MSAs with state higher education governing bodies have fewer FPHIEDs within 
their respective borders. 
This suggests the need to strengthen state higher education governance structures, 
from coordinating bodies to governing bodies, as means to regulate the behavior of 
FPHIEDs.  Therefore, strengthened higher education governance structures give greater 
authority to state agencies to regulate FPHIEDs and have the ability to enhance higher 
education policy.  Unintended is the potential for greater restriction of public and private 
non-profit institutions.  Currently there is concern that non-profit postsecondary institutions, 
particularly public institutions, are heavily regulated and overburdened.  Increased 
regulations of FPHIEDs may increase the regulations of all higher education institutions. 
 
Policy Implications  
Stronger governance structures have the ability to improve the development and 
effectiveness of policy (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001).  This study assumes that state 
higher education policies are established to regulate the behaviors of higher educational 
institutions in the state.  While the findings lack evidence to support any statistically 
significant impact of the state higher education regulatory characteristics on the behaviors 
of FPHIEDs, the implications have policy significance.  Policy evaluations of higher 
education and economic development policies at both the state and federal levels are needed 
to determine effectiveness in meeting stated objectives, and to determine the impact of 
unintended consequences.  For example, state higher education policy that regulates 
FPHIEDs may be deemed effective.  However, its restriction of FPHIEDs may undermine 
economic development policies that seek to lure business and industry into the state.  In the 
same way, federal higher education policies should be evaluated.  Some federal policies that 
seek to increase postsecondary educational achievement may, in fact, encourage the 
proliferation of FPHIEDs and ultimately minimize the value of higher education attainment.  
Another unintended consequence is that by increasing regulations of FPHIEDs, and 
therefore restricting their operations, the higher education options of minorities and working 
adults will be limited.  Because FPHIEDs target minorities and working adults, restraining 
FPHIEDs will likely limit the educational opportunities of those populations, thereby 
undermining postsecondary achievement goals at state and national levels.  
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The research presented here supports the need for more consistent and 
strengthened federal regulations of FPHIEDs.  Currently, the structure that devolves federal 
regulation to independent regional accrediting agencies seems inadequate.  Four of the six 
regional accrediting agencies were not found to have statistically significant influences on 
the number of FPHIEDs.  Differences found between regional accrediting agencies require 
consistency to ensure regulatory equity across the US states.  Therefore, a federal level 
evaluation of regional accreditation policies is necessary to assess equity and equality across 
agencies in the regulation of FPHIEDs.  Higher education regulatory consistency across US 
states is beneficial.  The establishment of uniform federal standards and policies minimizes 
“accreditation shopping” (Kinser 2005).  It facilitates less complex evaluation of 
institutional adherence to federal regulations.  Additionally, it mitigates concerns of 
discrimination among regional accrediting agencies (AAUP 2007). 
Formulation of new policies, strengthening current policies, and evaluating all 
higher education policies that regulate the operations of FPHIEDs, such as higher education 
regulations and/or consumer protection laws, will serve to benefit the public good.  The 
result is either further protection of the public from the profit-seeking behaviors of 
FPHIEDs or promotion of economic development objectives.  For example, if a state 
desires to limit the spread of FPHIEDs and/or decrease the risk of diploma mills within its 
borders it should consider strengthening its higher education policies.  California is a state 
that could potentially benefit from increased regulations of higher education institutions. 
California currently hosts a large number of FPHIEDs but the state higher education agency 
exhibits no regulatory characteristics.  On the other hand, a state such as Delaware may 
desire to increase the educational choices of its residents while recruiting new businesses to 
its state.  Delaware may consider loosening its regulations of FPHIEDs and permit them to 
establish physical campuses in their state. 
How states implement plans to achieve higher education and economic outcomes 
is another consideration related to for-profit higher education regulation.  State higher 
education agencies that exhibit strong governance structures can take a bottom-up approach 
to implementation, primarily because they have legislative authority to act.  For example, 
governing bodies can develop their own programs to regulate for-profit higher education 
institutions.  Once the program or policy is developed, those agencies can implement them.  
This is a bottom-up model of implementation.  The result of such an implementation is 
diversity of regulation of FPHIEDs across the states in the US (Matland 1995).  From a top-
down approach, however, state agencies must administratively implement changes in state 
higher education governance structure and policies from elected officials.  Implementation 
done in this way focuses on the language of the policy, which purposes to guide the actions 
of state agency administrators.  Public administrators must clarify policy goals, and then 
execute policies in ways that minimize impact on other, sometimes contradictory, 
legislative goals (Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Matland 1995).  Hence, legislators must be 
specific about goals pertaining to the regulation of for-profit higher education institutions 
and/or economic development initiatives, as both can work in support of each other or 
against each other.  For example, restricting FPHIEDs can undermine recruitment and 
preservation of businesses in a state.  Additionally, public agencies that historically do not 
interact, such as consumer protection agencies and higher education agencies, must work 
together to maximize effectiveness in meeting legislative objectives.  The top-down 
approach requires state higher education administrators to take care to match 
implementation practices to legislatively sanctioned objectives and outcomes (Howlett and 
Ramesh 2003). 
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Conclusion  
The paper examined the impact of the US higher education regulatory environment on the 
presence of FPHIEDs and found that strong state higher education governance structures 
had negative impact on the prevalence of FPHIEDs.  Additionally, states within the 
jurisdictions of perceivably stronger regional accreditation agencies are more likely to have 
fewer FPHIEDs (the strength of the regional accrediting agencies is suggested in the 
literature but outside the scope of this study).  Thus, the claim that tougher regulations 
suppress business and economic growth is supported.  Consequently, for states that desire to 
decrease the prevalence of FPHIEDs, legislatures need to strengthen state higher education 
governance structures.  At the end of the day, public policy is a question of preference.  In 
other words, states who desire to decrease the prevalence of FPHIEDs can choose to 
strengthen their regulatory agencies/bodies. Conversely, states that want to increase the 
presence of FPHIEDs should weaken their governance structures. In the long term, states 
with stronger higher education regulatory agencies, suggesting improved quality, would 
attract better institutions and better outcomes, ultimately contributing to a well-educated 
workforce. 
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